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FEDERAL PREEMPTION UNDER THE NLRA: A RULE




It is now more than twenty-five years since the United States
Supreme Court established in San Diego Building Trades Council v. GarmonI
one of the broadest rules of federal preemption ever created by the
Court. 2 Garmon provides, with some exceptions, that neither state nor
federal courts can regulate conduct that is actually or arguably protected
* Associate, Holland and Hart, Denver Colorado. J.D., University of Utah (1984);
M.A., University of Northern Colorado (1974); B.S., Illinois State University (1973).
** Partner, Holland and Hart, Denver, Colorado. J.D., University of Toledo (1977);
B.S., Ohio State University (1974).
1. 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmon, a union had begun the peaceful picketing of the
employer's business after the employer had refused to recognize the union as the exclusive
bargaining agent for employees. Id. at 237. The employer brought suit in state court and
obtained an injunction to enjoin the union from picketing and from using other pressure
to force a collective bargaining agreement and was awarded $1,000 for damages for loss to
the business as a result of the picketing. Id. at 237-38. Initially, the case worked its way to
the Supreme Court where it was held that the preemption issues could not be adjudicated
until it was determined whether the award of damages was proper under California law.
353 U.S. 26, 29 (1957). On remand, the California court set aside the injunction on the
basis of the preemption doctrine, but sustained the award of damages. Garmon v. San
Diego Building Trades Council, 49 Cal.2d 595, 320 P.2d 473 (1958). Once again, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, and determined that the California court did not have
jurisdiction to award damages arising out of peaceful union activity which it could not
enjoin.
The Garmon decision generated a large body of critical literature. See, e.g., McCoid,
State Regulation of Labor-Management Relations: The Impact of Garmon and Landrum-Griffin, 48
IOWA L. REV. 578 (1963); Meltzer, The Supreme Court, Congress and State Jurisdiction Over Labor
Relations: 1, 59 COLUM. L. REV. 6 (1959); 74 HARV. L. REV. 641 (1961).
2. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA AND J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
267-70 (1977) (discussing the preemption doctrine). Federal preemption is a pragmatic
doctrine derived from the need to avoid conflicts between state and federal law. Under the
Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, all laws of the United States made in pursu-
ance of the Constitution become the supreme law of the land. The difficult aspect of the
preemption doctrine is determining when a congressional enactment conflicts with state
law. The preemption issue is not difficult when the state and federal laws are mutually
exclusive; however, it is not always clear whether the state law actually conflicts with fed-
eral law. The touchstone for determining federal preemption is congressional intent:
whether Congress intended there to be any room for federal regulation of the field that is
the subject of the federal enactment. Because congressional enactments generally are si-
lent on the question of preemption, the courts are left to infer the intent of Congress from
the language, structure and purpose of the federal enactment. When a scheme of federal
regulation is so pervasive that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that Congress
left room for the states to operate, the state law will be preempted. See Cloverleaf Butter
Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1945). Second, an act of Congress may involve a field of
regulation in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system must rule to
the exclusion of any state law. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 313 U.S. 52 (1941). Finally, a state
law may reflect a policy that is inconsistent with the goals set forth in a federal statute. See
Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
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or prohibited by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). 3 Although it
can be argued that the exceptions to Garmon have swallowed up the
rule,4 the Supreme Court slavishly adheres to the Gannon formulation.
The result is to ignore the fundamental principles which federal pre-
emption was meant to serve.
The time has come to consider carefully whether the doctrine of
federal preemption under the NLRA should be reformulated. Garmon
struck a balance that favored federal rather than state resolution of pre-
emption issues and the protection of federal rights created by labor law
rather than the protection of state created rights. Assuming those bal-
ances were proper when struck, there is a serious question whether they
are appropriate for the 1980s and beyond.
After examining the purposes of federal labor law and the policy
established by Gannon, this article surveys state compliance with Gannon.
The article then critically evaluates the fundamental assumptions that
underlie the Gannon decision. Finally, it argues that the blanket rule of
the Gannon decision should be rejected in favor of a rule that expressly
balances state and federal interests when determining whether preemp-
tion is appropriate.
I. PURPOSES OF FEDERAL LABOR LAw
A. Basic Purposes of Federal Labor Law
The National Labor Relations Act, as originally adopted, was part of
a series of laws designed to lift the United States out of the economic
misery of the 1930s. The Act established the basis for collective bar-
gaining which was viewed as an answer to the labor strife then endemic
in American society. 5 The strike or lockout was to be replaced by rea-
soned negotiation which would search out the economic common
ground for management and labor. To ensure that collective bargaining
would take place, Congress established in section 7 of the NLRA6 that
certain collective action by workers would be protected by federal law.
Thus, the NLRA manifested a conscious choice to give impetus to the
fledgling American labor movement by protecting collective action from
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982). The NLRA, commonly known as the Wagner Act of
1935, was amended by the Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act of 1947, and
amended again by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin)
Act of 1959.
4. See Bryson, A Matter of Wooden Logic: Labor Law Preemption and Individual Rights, 51
TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1040 (1937).
5. See Marshall, The Future of the American Labor Movement: The Role of Federal Law, 57
CH. [-] KENT L. REV. 521, 526 (1981). The National Labor Relations Act was part of the
New Deal legislation designed to lift the United States out of the economic crisis of the
1930's. See THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw 25 (C. Morris ed. 2d ed. 1983) (hereinafter "DE-
VELOPING LABOR Law").
6. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). That section guarantees to employees "'the right to self-
organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection. Id. See also DE-
VELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 5, at 28.
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retaliation by management and hostile state legislatures and courts. 7
A truly federal labor law was envisioned because it was felt that only
the federal government could respond to the dangers that lurked in na-
tional economic markets. Labor strife in the steel, railroad, or coal in-
dustries threatened the welfare of the entire economy. States,
responding in multifarious ways, could not be relied on to cope with
national economic markets. Indeed, states could undermine a uniform
regulation of markets by competing for the location of business with la-
bor laws that favored management over labor. Thus, state laws could
cause the federal policy of spreading the benefits of collective bargain-
ing to founder.
The heart of federal labor law is found in sections 7 and 8 of the
NLRA which establish the ground rules for industrial combat.8 As origi-
nally enacted, the NLRA only delineated unfair labor practices by man-
agement; but as political winds changed the NLRA was amended to
include a great array of union unfair labor practices. 9 Sections 7 and 8,
therefore, establish a balance of bargaining power between management
and labor. The protection of some forms of industrial combat, and the
prohibition of others, created a framework within which union organiza-
tion and collective bargaining could take place.
B. The Threat of State Interference
There is no doubt that the NLRA was, in part, adopted to promote
the organization of labor in the United States.' 0 The recognition of the
entity status of the modern corporation facilitated the aggregation of
capital. Meanwhile, the independent craftsman supported by several ap-
prentices was replaced by largescale manufacturing operations with far
greater bargaining power than the atomized labor market. In addition,
the division of labor, as "perfected" by scientific management, deskilled
the labor market, causing the individual worker to become fungible. I1
Existing crafts were broken down into elementary routine tasks to be
performed repetitively by workers in discrete departments of the mod-
ern factory. The NLRA and related labor laws recognized the virtual
impotence of the American worker and established a legal framework to
invigorate the floundering labor movement. The standard of living for
most Americans could be improved only by strengthening the relative
bargaining power of labor, and strength was to be found in
organization.
7. See Marshall, supra note 5 at 526; DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 5, at 29.
8. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158 (1982).
9. Id. § 158(b).
10. See History and Development, in ARBITRATING LABOR CASES 10-11 (N. Levin ed.
1974). The findings and declaration of policy of the National Labor Relations Act make
clear that Congress was concerned about the right of employees to organize and engage in
collective bargaining for the purpose of avoiding strikes and other forms of industrial
strife. 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1982).
11. See Massie, Management Theory, in THE HANDBOOK OF ORGANIZAnONS 387-422 (.
March ed. 1965).
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The American labor movement had floundered largely because of
hostile state and federal courts. 12 Since the earliest days of the labor
movement in this country, the courts created legal doctrines to block
labor's every move. The illegal conspiracy doctrine, prima facie tort and
labor injunction were part of the arsenal used to thwart the effort to
organize labor. 13 The labor injunction was one of the most effective
weapons for counter-acting collective action by labor because the in-
junction can eliminate the momentum that is necessary to organize
workers or ensure the success of collective action. Courts granted in-
junctions in ex parte hearings on the basis of scandalous affidavits and
purported to apply the injunction to all persons with knowledge of the
court's order even if those persons were not parties to the court
action. 14
Even the adoption of federal legislation could not, by itself, protect
American labor from the hostility of many federal and state courts. The
United States Supreme Court typified that hostility by narrowly constru-
ing statutes designed to excempt labor from the effects of antitrust
laws.' 5 A shift in the Supreme Court's attitude ultimately caused the
Court to align itself with the Congress. That shift was most apparent in
1937 when the Court upheld the constitutionality of the National Labor
Relations Act. 16
By the time the NLRA was adopted, many state governments al-
ready had adopted their own comprehensive labor laws. In addition,
state courts continued to apply common law doctrines and generic eco-
nomic regulations to labor cases. Admittedly, not all state regulation of
labor-management relations was motivated by hostility toward labor.
Some part of that regulation was due to a feeling that labor strife was a
proper subject for the police power of the state. Nonetheless, conflict
between state and federal laws was inevitable and the Supreme Court
would need to determine the extent to which federal law displaced state
regulation of labor-management relations.
12. See Cox, Federalism in the Law of Labor Relations, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1297, 1307
(1954). One reason for the perceived hostility of state courts was the desire by states to
compete for the location of business at the expense of the worker. Id. at 1317.
13. See F. FRANKFURTER & N. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, 2-5 (1930).
14. Id. at 17-24; 66-81; and 86-89. The effect of the injunction was to cripple the
labor movement by taking "the wind" out of the momentum that is necessary to organize
workers or to make collective action successful. Id. at 200.
15. See Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921). The Supreme
Court first determined that antitrust laws applied to organized labor in Loewe v. Lawlor,
208 U.S. 274 (1908). Congress attempted to limit the application of antitrust laws to or-
ganized labor in §§ 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act. 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 12 et. (1982).
16. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See also Cox, supra note
5, at 1298-99. The Supreme Court's shift in attitude regarding the scope of the Com-
merce Clause has resulted in a situation where there is now virtually no area that cannot be
regulated by Congress under the Commerce power. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111
(1942).
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C. Federal Labor Law Preemption
The Supreme Court began by defining the scope of federal labor
law preemption on a piecemeal basis. It established early that the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board (NLRB or Board) would be responsible for
regulating the certification of labor unions in those industries subject to
the Board's jurisdiction. 17 States could neither certify a rival union nor
regulate the officers and agents of a certified union.18 Similiarly, the
states could not prohibit the exercise of rights protected by the NLRA.19
On the other hand, federal regulation of labor-management relations
was held not to be exclusive. Thus, when a labor dispute was accompa-
nied by violence, the state was free to regulate the violent conduct.
2 0
States also could regulate certain nonviolent labor practices that were
neither protected nor prohibited by the NLRA.
2 1
The Court's task of defining the scope of federal preemption was
frustrated by Congress' failure to address the extent to which the NLRA
displaced state law; yet, congressional intent is the touchstone for deter-
mining the scope of federal preemption. 22 Although Congress deter-
mined that the NLRB would have jurisdiction to adjudicate charges of
"unfair labor practices,"12 3 that term is not self-defining. Thus, the
Supreme Court faced two recurrent issues: did the state common or
statutory law implicate conduct within the ambit of the NLRA and, if so,
did the state law unreasonably interfere with the federal regulation of
that conduct.
Eventually, the Supreme Court grew weary of its piecemeal adjudi-
cation of federal preemption, and in San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon,24 announced one of the broadest rules of preemption in any
field of federal law. The Court determined that the states were not free
to regulate conduct which was actually or arguably protected or prohib-
ited by the NLRA.
2 5
17. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S. 767
(1947).
18. See, e.g., La Cross Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board,
336 U.S. 18 (1949); Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
19, See Hill v. Florida, 325 U.S. 538 (1945).
20. See UAW v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131
(1957); United Construction Workers v. Laburnum Construction Corp., 347 U.S. 656
(1954); Allen-Bradley v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 315 U.S. 740, 749
(1942).
21. See, e.g., UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245
(1949) (state could regulate intermittant work stoppages); Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co.
v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 301 (1949) (state could prohibit re-
quirement of union maintenance-of-membership clause).
22. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 239-240 (1959).
23. 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1982).
24. 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
25. Id. at 244-45.
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II. FEDERAL LABOR LAW PREEMPTION UNDER GARMON
A. Varieties of Federal Labor Law Preemption
Federal labor law preemption is not a monolithic construct; rather,
there are no less than five variations on the theme of federal preemp-
tion. First, federal law preempts state laws which purport to perform the
administrative functions of the NLRB when the affected industry is
within the Board's jurisdiction. 26 Thus, for example, the states are not
free to certify unions as the authorized bargaining agent for employees
subject to NLRB jurisdiction. 2 7 Second, federal law limits the extent to
which states can restrict the terms and conditions of employment be-
cause those terms and conditions are protected as appropriate for deter-
mination by collective bargaining. 28 Third, under Garmon, states cannot
regulate conduct that is actually or arguably protected or prohibited by
Sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA.2 9 It is this branch of the federal preemp-
tion doctrine that is the focus of this article. The fourth variety of fed-
eral preemption concerns conduct that is neither protected nor
prohibited by federal law, but which the states still are not free to regu-
late because it was Congress' intent to leave such conduct to the free
play of economic forces.3 0 Finally, preemption involves the extent to
which state entitlement programs can include workers involved in a la-
bor dispute.
3 1
B. Board Preemption: Garmon and its Progeny
Ad hoc rationalization likely could discover some over-arching prin-
ciple which explains all varieties of federal labor law preemption. This
paper focuses, however, only on federal preemption involving unfair la-
bor practices, otherwise known as "Board preemption." Garmon crystal-
lized the principles of Board preemption, clearly identifying two strands
of the doctrine:
When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities
which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor
practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment re-
quires that state jurisdiction must yield . . . . At times it has
26. See, e.g., Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 330 U.S.
767 (1947).
27. See La Crosse Telephone Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336
U.S. 18 (1949).
28. Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959) (state cannot
apply antitrust law to issues that are subject of mandatory bargaining under the NLRA).
The NLRA establishes the duty of employers and unions to negotiate over mandatory
terms of bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982).
29. 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959).
30. See, e.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Local 20, Teamsters v. Morton, 377 U.S. 252 (1964).
31. See, e.g., New York Telephone Co. v. New York State Department of Labor, 440
U.S. 519 (1979). Federal preemption cases which involve state entitlement programs are
similar to those in which the state seeks to prohibit conduct permitted by federal labor law.
The difference between the cases is that entitlement programs provide benefits to partners
who engage in permitted behavior rather than attempting to sanction those persons.
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not been clear whether the particular activity regulated by the
States was governed by § 7 or § 8 or was, perhaps, outside both
these sections. But courts are not primary tribunals to adjudi-
cate such issues. It is essential to the administration of the
[NLRA] that these determinations be left in the first instance to
the National Labor Relations Board. What is outside the scope
of this Court's authority cannot remain within a State's power
and state jurisdiction too must yield to the exclusive primary
competence of the Board.
3 2
Thus, the essence of Garmon is that neither state nor federal courts can
exercise jurisdiction over conduct that is actually or arguably protected
or prohibited by the NLRA. To the Garmon court, it did not matter
whether the state law was one of general application or one specifically
designed to apply to labor-management relations.
33
The Garmon court recognized that there were exceptions to the
broad rule of federal preemption which it had created. First, jurisdiction
is not withdrawn from the states "to regulate where the activity regu-
lated was a merely peripheral concern of the Labor Management Rela-
tions Act."' 3 4 Second, states still are free to regulate conduct that
"touched interests so deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility
that, in the absence of compelling congressional direction, [the Court]
could not infer that Congress had deprived the States of the power to
act."'3 5 In a later decision, the Court created another exception which
applies when the rule of law is "so structured and administered that...
it is safe to presume that judicial supervision will not disserve the inter-
ests promoted by the federal labor statutes."
3 6
In 1978, the Supreme Court created yet another exception to Gar-
mon in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters.3 7 Sears held that a state court
action for peaceful trespassory picketing is not preempted when the
state court plaintiff had no opportunity to present the matter to the
NLRB. 38 Thus, the primary jurisdiction strand of Board preemption is
inappropriate in those cases when the conduct at issue will not be re-
viewed by the Board.
C. Branches of the Garmon Doctrine
There are three reasonably distinct branches to the Gannon doc-
trine. The first, and most obvious, is that under the supremacy clause, 39
states cannot prohibit conduct that is protected by the NLRA.40 Like-
32. 359 U.S. 236, 244-45 (1959).
33. Id. at 244 n.3. For a general discussion of Garmon, see Cox, Recent Developments in
Federal Labor Law Preemption, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 277, 277-78 (1980).
34. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 243.
35. Id. at 244.
36. Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 297-
98 (1971).
37. 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
38. Id. at 207.
39. U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2.
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 and 158(a) (1982). This branch of the preemption doctrine pro-
hibits states from interfering with conduct protected under federal law. See Wellington,
1985]
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wise, states cannot protect prohibited conduct by sanctioning parties
who would interfere with the prohibited conduct.
Primary jurisdiction is the second branch to Board preemption, but
it is not the same type of primary jurisdiction discussed in administrative
law. 4 1 Typically, primary jurisdiction implies that an administrative tri-
bunal has the initial responsibility for determining some particular issue.
It is likely that a court will then make thefinal determination on the is-
sue. Under Garmon, state courts are completely preempted from adjudicat-
ing controversies that actually or arguably involve protected or
prohibited conduct under the NLRA.4 2  Only after the Board deter-
mines 'that the conduct at issue is not within the broad penumbras of the
NLRA can the state proceed to adjudicate the dispute; even then, how-
ever, it is arguable that Congress intended that the conduct be subject to
the free play of economic forces and free from interference of state
laws.
4 3
The third branch to the Garmon doctrine is a variation on
supremacy: the states cannot provide remedies to aggrieved parties
when those remedies would interfere with a uniform body of federal la-
bor law. 4 4 The states are not free to sanction persons who engage in
unfair labor practices even though the state would apply federal law. 4 5
Additionally, states cannot remedy the violation of state created rights
when the remedy would unreasonably interfere with the enforcement of
federal labor law. 46 Presumably, the remedies established in the NLRA
help to create the balance in bargaining power that Congress thought
was necessary to foster collective bargaining.
Labor and the Federal System, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 542, 545-49 (1959). The branch also bars
the state from remedying conduct prohibited by federal law. This is true because the
Supreme Court has determined that state remedies for violations of federal law also will
result in serious conflicts that undermine a uniform system of federal regulation of labor
law. See Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1337, 1342-43 (1972).
Prohibiting states from sanctioning conduct prohibited by federal law is premised on the
notion that the NLRA establishes a balance of power in sections 7 and 8, and that that
balance is preserved properly by the sanctions afforded in the Act. See Lesnick, Preemption
Reconsidered. The Apparent Reaffirmation ofGarmon, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 469,477 (1972). For
example, the fear of state damages might deter conduct that is protected by federal law in
addition to that conduct which is prohibited. See Wellington, at 553.
41. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 199
n.29 (1978).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Lodge 76, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Commission, 427 U.S. 132 (1976) (states could not regulate refusal of organized labor to
work overtime).
44. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274
(1971). In Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977), the
Supreme Court established a three part test to determine if Garmon should be applied:
first, that there was no risk that a state would prohibit conduct that Congress intended to
protect; second, that there was an overriding state interest in protecting residents from an
invasion of their rights; and, third, that there was little risk that the state cause of action
would interfere with the effective administration of national labor policy. Id. at 298.
45. See supra note 40 and the discussion therein.
46. See, e.g., Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955), where the Supreme
Court held that the state could not regulate labor relations through the use of a general
restraint of trade statue.
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D. The Justification for Board Preemption
Board preemption as embodied in Garmon has been justified on var-
ious grounds: to ensure the uniform application of federal labor law; to
guarantee expertise in the adjudication of the preemption doctrine; and
to protect the labor movement from hostile state courts.
4 7
Federal preemption is not necessary to ensure that federal law is ap-
plied when resolving labor disputes; 48 it is thought to be necessary to
ensure that federal law is applied uniformly.49 The Supreme Court has
argued that different judicial procedures can undermine uniformity as
readily as the application of different substantive rules of law. 50 Uni-
formity implies that parties in different parts of the country will be
treated alike and that state courts will be unable to compete for business
by adopting procedural rules that would favor management.
Uniformity could, however, be achieved by vesting jurisdiction to
adjudicate labor disputes exclusively in federal courts; but, the Garmon
doctrine also ousts federal courts from resolving disputes in which pro-
tected or prohibited conduct might be in issue. That ouster is premised
on the belief that an expert administrative tribunal is better equipped to
determine when conduct is protected or prohibited by the NLRA. 5 1 Os-
tensibly, the Board is a superior body for ascertaining when conduct
must be protected or proscribed to further the goals that Congress in-
tended to advance when it enacted the National Labor Relations Act.
Implicit in the Garmon doctrine is the desire to protect the labor
movement from hostile state courts. "States' rights" have always been
equated with antiunion policies, while "federal preemption" is seen as
prounion. 52 Those tendencies, no doubt, go back to the early days of
the labor movement when state courts created doctrines that stifled the
growth of collective labor action. It probably is true that state courts in
some regions of the country continue to display a marked antiunion
bias.
47. See Come, Federal Preemption of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the
Application of Garmon, 56 VA. L. REV. 1435, 1436-37 (1970). There are a variety of factors
that weigh in favor of a federal, as opposed to a state, labor law. Federal labor law is
important for the purpose of regulating the national economy, to prohibit interstate com-
petition for business at the expense of labor, to provide convenience to parties through a
uniform system of regulation and for spreading the benefits of the federal labor policy.
See, Cox, supra note 12, at 1302-04. On the other hand. state regulation often can be more
convenient to the parties involved, can result in better decision-making because the deci-
sion-makers are closer to the problem, can provide the opportunity for flexible solutions
and can encourage local responsibility. Id. at 1304-05.
48. For example, states can be given concurrent jurisdiction to determine issues in-
volving labor-management relations, yet be required to apply federal law to the resolution
of those issues. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957) (states
have concurrent jurisdiction over § 301 claims but must apply federal law).
49. See Come, supra note 7, at 1452.
50. See Garner v. Teamsters Union Lodge 776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953) (even if
the same substantive laws applied, different tribunals and procedures are likely to result in
"incompatible or conflicting adjudications").
51. See Come supra note 47, at 1443-44 (Board expertise required to balance private
rights and union § 7 rights).
52. Cox, supra note 12, at 1302.
1985]
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Finally, Garmon's broad rule of preemption was designed to reduce
the tremendous number of cases coming to the Supreme Court on the
issue of preemption. The Court tired of building the preemption doc-
trine brick by brick and adopted an approach that would discourage the
states from exercising jurisdiction over conduct that even arguably was
within the ambit of the NLRA. Not only did constant adjudication dissi-
pate judicial resources, it taxed the ability of the Court to define pro-
tected and prohibited conduct.
E. Current Analytical Method
The Garmon doctrine has been transformed into a rigid analytical
method which the Supreme Court uses to resolve federal preemption
questions. First, the Court determines whether the conduct at issue is
actually or arguably protected or prohibited by the NLRA. 53 Although
the Court does not usurp the Board's power, it must decide whether the
conduct sought to be regulated by the state is within the ambit of the
NLRA. Occasionally, forgetting its manners, the Supreme Court deter-
mines whether the conduct being considered is protected or prohib-
ited.5 4  The second part of the analytical process is to determine
whether one of the exceptions to the rule applies. Thus, the Congress
engages in a pigeon-holing exercise as it tries to decide whether the
facts of the case being considered fit either the "traditional state con-
cern" 55 or "merely peripheral concern" exception.
56
Finally, the Court decides whether the state action would interfere
with the actually or arguably protected or prohibited conduct. 5 7 When
the state regulates only some aspects of a labor dispute, it is not immedi-
ately clear whether the state action will unreasonably interfere with the
federal law. Before Garmon, the Court applied a test based on the gen-
eral versus specific nature of the state law. 58 A state law of general ap-
plicability is less likely to interfere with federal labor law than a state law
53. See Note, Labor Law-Invoking State Trespass Laws to Enjoin Peaceful Union Picketing, 15
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 288, 292-93 (1979).
54. See, e.g., Int'l Longshoremen's Ass'n Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S.
195 (1970); UAW Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 336 U.S. 245
(1949).
55. See Hooton, The Exceptional Garmon Doctrine, 26 LAB. L. J. 49, 51-63 (1975) (dis-
cussing the Garmon exceptions). Cases within this exception include UAW v. Russell, 356
U.S. 634 (1958); Youngdahl v. Rainfair, Inc., 355 U.S. 131 (1957); and United Construc-
tion Workers v. Labrunun Construction Co., 347 U.S. 656 (1945).
56. See Hooton, supra note 55, at 51-63. Cases within this exception include Linn v.
United Plant Guard Workers Local 114, 383 U.S. 53 (1966) (malicious libel); Hanna Min-
ing Co. v. Dist. 2 Marine Engineers Beneficial Ass'n, 382 U.S. 181 (1965) (regulation of
supervisory employees); and Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958)
(reinstatement to union status).
57. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180,
197 (1978), where the Supreme Court stated that the critical inquiry was "whether the
controversy presented to the state court is identical to . . .or different from . . . that
which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board."
58. See Cox, supra note 12, at 1323-24. A law of general application is one that has no
reference to the labor or management status of the parties involved in the litigation. A law
of specific application is one that could be applied only to labor or management parties.
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specifically designed to regulate labor-management relations. 59 The
Court now looks to the elements of the state cause of action to deter-
mine whether they are identical with the federal claim. 60
Although the Supreme Court habitually recites the purposes to be
served by Garmon 6l and the rationale for exceptions to the doctrine, 62
the Court has failed to consider carefully whether the policy assump-
tions which support Garmon still are valid. Rather than carefully weigh-
ing competing state and federal interests, the Court applies a rigid
conclusory test to resolve questions of preemption.
III. BOARD PREEMPTION IN THE STATE COURTS
A. A Rule Made to be Broken
The analytical method used to apply the Garmon rule invites state
courts to hold that preemption does not apply to the case before them.
A state court faced with a preemption issue must decide if the conduct at
issue is within the construction of the NLRA, if the state cause of action
would interfere with the federal remedy for an unfair labor practice, and
if the exceptions to Garmon do not apply. If the answer to any of those
subissues is "no," preemption is not appropriate.
It is the exceptions to Garmon that provide the widest escape hatch
to the rule. First, preemption does not apply when the cause of action
touches "interests . . .deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibil-
ity. ' ' 63 Second, preemption is not proper when the conduct at issue is
"a merely peripheral concern" of federal law. 64 Finally, if the state
cause of action is unlikely to interfere with the purposes of federal labor
law, the action is not preempted by the Board.6 5
Unless the state cause of action is identical to the one that would be
presented to the Board, state courts likely will find that an exception to
Garmon applies. States traditionally have been responsible for protect-
ing health, safety and public order by the exercise of their police powers.
Thus, state courts will not readily assume that Congress, acting against a
backdrop of general state statutory and common law, intended to pre-
empt a cause of action arising under those laws. 6 6 The result is that a
broad rule of preemption is construed narrowly to a point where pre-
emption is the exception and not the rule. Acting with a clear con-
59. Id.
60. See Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 681.
(1983).
61. Id. at 675-76.
62. Id. at 1459. See also DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 5, at 1512-17.
63. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244.
64. Id. at 243.
65. See Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
66. The states traditionally have been responsible for protecting property rights and
the health and safety of their citizens. When Congress enacted the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, it did so knowing that state laws of a general nature were in existence and did
nothing to preempt those laws from applying to labor management relationships. See
Whitacre, Property Rights and Pre-emption Under the National Labor Relations Act, 47 Mo. L. REV.
59 (1982).
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science, state courts can determine that the issues before them touch
interests rooted in local feeling or are of merely peripheral concern to
the federal law.
B. Charting Compliance Under Garmon
Garmon attempted to establish a broad rule of preemption designed,
in part, to minimize state interference with federal labor law. However,
Garmon can be successful only if it is applied properly by state courts
because they adjudicate far more cases in which Board preemption is an
issue than does the Supreme Court. If state courts do not understand
Garmon, or simply refuse to follow it, the goals of the decision cannot be
realized.
One of the more recurrent issues facing state courts is the extent to
which federal labor law preempts the application of state trespass laws
to labor disputes. Trespass laws come into play most often when union
organizers or picketers enter private property to conduct their activities.
Because the Supreme Court, has not squarely addressed the issue, 6 7
state courts have been left to determine the vitality of trespass laws when
applied in a labor relations context.6 8 A majority of the state courts fac-
ing the issue have held that the NLRA does not preempt state trespass
laws applied to labor disputants. 69 Although the courts generally agree
that trespass laws can be applied against union organizers who are not
employees,7 0 the decisions are not in agreement on the issue of peaceful
trespassory picketing by employees following a strike.
7 1
Typical of state court reasoning is the decision in May Department
Store Co. v. Teamsters Union Local No. 74372 where the Illinois Supreme
Court held that a state trespass law applied to union organizers was not
preempted by the NLRA even though the union had filed an unfair labor
practice charge against the employer. 73 The court stressed the historic
interest of the states in maintaining domestic peace through the use of
67. In Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 427 v. Fairlawn Meats, Inc., 353 U.S. 20, 24-
25 (1957), the Supreme Court left open the issue of whether a state could apply its tres-
pass laws to peaceful trespassory picketers. When the issue again came before the court in
Taggart v. Weinacker's, Inc., 397 U.S. 223 (1970) the Supreme Court dismissed a writ of
certiorari as having been improvidently granted. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice
Burger stressed that when enacting the NLRA, Congress acted against the backdrop of
"the general application of state trespass laws." 397 U.S. at 228.
68. Despite the ChiefJustice's opinion, the trespass issue remains. See Cox, supra note
33, at 280. See also Note, supra note 53, at 295.
69. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Noflke, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 364 N.E.2d 1274 (1977);
People v. Bush, 39 N.Y.2d 529, 349 N.E.2d 832 (1976); May Department Stores Co. v.
Teamsters Union Local 743, 64 III. 2d 153, 355 N.E.2d 7; (1976); Hood v. Safford, 213
Tenn. 684, 378 S.W.2d 766 (1964). But see Freeman v. Retail Clerks Union Local 1207, 53
Wash. 2d 426, 363 P.2d 803 (1961).
70. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Noffke, 5 Mass. App. Ct. 496, 364 N.E.2d 1274 (1977).
71. Compare PTA Sales, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 462, 96 N.M. 581, 633 P.2d 689
(1981) with Wiggins & Co., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union Local 1557, 595 S.W.2d 802 (Tenn.
1980).
72. 355 N.E.2d 7 (I1. 1976).
73. Id. at 11.
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trespass laws. 74 In addition, the court reasoned that even peaceful
trespassory picketing could lead to violence.7 5 Thus, the court em-
ployed a Garmon exception and concluded that the state's interest in do-
mestic peace overrode any possible interference with federal labor law.
State courts now use the identity between the state cause of action
and the possible unfair labor practice as the touchstone for determining
whether a state tort or contract claim is preempted. 76 When the state
claim is identical to the issue that could be presented to the Board, state
courts hold that preemption is proper regardless of whether the state
law is one of general applicability or one specifically applied to labor-
management relations.
77
When the state court reasons that the state cause of action is some-
how different from the unfair labor practice charge, the court will be
more reluctant to find preemption. 7 8 Perhaps the best recent example
of this practice is the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Lueck
v. Aetna Life Insurance Co..79 In Lueck, the employee/plaintiff charged that
the employer had exercised bad faith in handling the employee's disabil-
ity claims pursuant to a disability plan which was part of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. The employer and its insurer argued that the state
tort action was preempted by the NLRA because the mishandling of the
disability payments arguably was a violation of section 8(a)(5) of that
Act.80 The court disagreed, emphasizing that the issue before the court
was the manner in which payments were made, not whether payments
were made or not.8 1 Thus, the issue facing the court was different than
that which would be presented to the Board. In addition, the court em-
phasized the Garmon exceptions, especially for issues touching local in-
terests, and held that the state interest was more important than any
possible interference with federal labor law.
8 2
Lueck points out one of the inherent difficulties with Garmon. The
state court must make some preliminary decision regarding the pro-
tected or prohibited nature of the conduct at issue; but, in doing so, the
court performs the Board's function. 83  In Lueck, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decided that the mishandling of disability payments is
not a violation of section 8(a)(5) and therefore, the state action was not
preempted. There is no real alternative to permitting the court to ana-
lyze whether the conduct at issue is within the scope of the NLRA; other-
74. id.
75. Id. at 10.
76. See, e.g., Gouveia v. Napili-Kai, Ltd., 65 Hawaii 189, 649 P.2d 1119, 1126 (1982).
77. Id.; Bebensee v. Ross Pierce Electric Corp., 400 Mich. 233, 253 N.W.2d 633
(1977); Schena v. Smiley, 488 Pa. 632, 413 A.2d 662 (1980).
78. See, e.g., Whelan's Inc. v. Kansas Department of Human Resources, 235 Kan. 425,
681 P.2d 621, 624 (1984).
79. 116 Wis.2d 559, 342 N.W.2d 699 (1984), cert. granted sub noma. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v.
Luech, 105 S. Ct. 80 (1984).
80. Id. at 704.
81. Id. at 704-07.
82. Id. at 707.
83. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 199
n. 29 (1978).
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wise, an employer always could argue that the state cause of action was
within the NLRA and thereby divest the state court ofjurisdiction. Con-
sequently, the state must make its own determination as to whether the
conduct is arguably prohibited or protected by federal law. Nonethe-
less, it is important to keep in mind that the state court determines in
the first instance whether the conduct at issue is within the scope of
NLRA.
States are more reluctant to find preemption for a cause of action
based on a state statute. Enactment of a state law more clearly empha-
sizes the state's interest in the conduct that might be subject to the
NLRA. Thus, state courts have held that a union agent can be prose-
cuted for using intimidating language,8 4 that an employee can maintain
an action for reinstatement after termination following a compensable
job-related injury, 85 and that employees can maintain a suit for unpaid
vacation pay even though the Board adjudicated a similar issue.
86
These decisions also focus on the similarity of the state cause of action
and the possbile unfair labor practice and the exceptions to Garmon.
It is clear that the states are struggling with the Garmon rule. It is
equally clear that many state courts are balancing the states' interest in
adjudicating the disputes before them with the federal interest in main-
taining the integrity of the national labor law. 8 7 Those courts are able
to avoid applying Garmon by reasoning that the state cause of action is
different from the possible unfair labor practice and that one of the ex-
ceptions to Garmon applies. 8 8 The net result is that the state's interest
overrides any potential interference with federal law.
IV. EVALUATING GARMON
A. The Basic Failure of the Rule
The United States Supreme Court established a broad rule of Board
preemption, in part, to avoid the constant adjudication of specific pre-
emption cases. The Court's effort was unsuccessful. Barely a term goes
by that the Supreme Court is not called on to determine the scope of
federal preemption.8 9 More importantly, Garmon has not withdrawn ju-
risdiction from the state courts. Gannon creates too many decision
points for state courts; not only can the courts determine the protected
or prohibited nature of the conduct at issue, the courts also determine
whether there will be interference with federal law and whether excep-
tions to the rule apply. Thus, Garnon has not been successful in estab-
84. People v. Holder, 119 I1. App. 3d 366, 456 N.E.2d 628 (1983).
85. Vaughn v. Pacific Northwest Bell Telephone Co., 289 Or. 73, 611 P.2d 281
(1980).
86. Whelan's, Inc. v. Kansas Department of Human Resources, 235 Kan. 425, 681
P.2d 621 (1984).
87. See, e.g., Lueck v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 116 Wis.2d 559, 342 N.W.2d 699, 707
(1984).
88. See, e.g., Whelan's, Inc. v. Kansas Department of Human Resources, 235 Kan. 425,
681 P.2d 621, 624 (1984).
89. See Come, Federal Preemption Since Garmon, 17 LAB. L.J. 195, 196 (1966).
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lishing a rule that protects federal labor law from interference by state
courts. Rather than search for another rule, it is time to consider care-
fully whether the assumptions of Garmon are now, if ever, valid.
B. Validity of the Garmon Assumptions
The Garmon decision is based on the need for an inviolate federal
law of labor relations.9 0 The finely tuned balancing of labor-manage-
ment relations established in sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA created the
optimum conditions for spreading the perceived benefits of collective
bargaining. At the same time, fledgling labor unions would be pro-
tected from hostile state courts. It is doubtful whether the federal gov-
ernment must continue its paternalistic policies toward collective
bargaining and labor unions. The labor movement has matured to a
point where it can defend itself in state courts. 9 ' Moreover, preemption
does not always protect employees from management. Often the doc-
trine withdraws jurisdiction from state courts to hear claims by employ-
ees against employers or unions.
9 2
If the issue were only the need to apply federal law to labor dis-
putes, state courts could have concurrent jurisdiction over unfair labor
practices but the Supreme Court has stressed the need for the uniform
application of federal laws. Uniformity, it is argued, requires that the
same law and procedures be applied. 9 3 Thus, a single, expert board was
established to create the uniformity required to effect federal labor prac-
tices. Unfortunately, uniformity is a myth in federal labor law. First, the
NLRA provides for review of Board decisions by the United States
Courts of Appeals.9 4 On any number of important labor issues, the cir-
cuits are split on the interpretation of federal labor law. 95 Second, the
inability or refusal of state courts to comply fully with Garmon principles
renders uniformity an impossibility.9 6 The various approaches taken by
90. See San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959)
(states that cannot be free to regulate conduct plainly within the central aim of federal
regulation). However, somewhat contrarily, states are free to adjudicate many issues
which have the potential to interfere with federal labor law. See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
San Diego Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 189 n. 14 (1978).
91. But see Marshall supra note 5, at 527 (arguing that there are still segments of the
labor pool that are unprotected by labor laws).
92. See, e.g., Local 926, Int'l Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669
(1983); Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters Local 25, 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
93. See Garner v. Teamsters Union Local 1776, 346 U.S. 485, 490-91 (1953).
94. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1982).
95. Ultimately, of course, guidance could come from the Supreme Court; however,
differences of opinion by the circuit courts are likely to continue. Admittedly, differences
among twelve circuit courts of appeals could be less troublesome than differences among
fifty state courts.
96. See, Updegraff, Preemption, Predictability and Progress in Labor Law, 17 HASTINGS L.J.
473, 483 (1966). The result of all of the factors that undermine uniformity in federal labor
law is that uniformity is a myth. See Amalgamated Ass'n of Motor Coach Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 318 (1971) (White, J., dissenting). Ultimate review by the
Supreme Court has been of little help because the Court's opinions have offered no over-
riding principles that can effectively guide the state courts. See, Cox, supra note 33, at 300.
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state courts regarding trespass laws evidences the lack of uniformity in-
herent in the Garmon formulation.
Board preemption also is justified on the basis of the need for deci-
sionmaking by an expert tribunal.9 7 Unfortunately, expert decisionmak-
ing also is a myth in labor relations. First, the Board's decisions are
reviewed by the federal circuit courts and, even with deference to agency
decisionmaking, the circuit courts are not reluctant to reverse a Board
order or to refuse to enforce a Board order.9 8 Second, the Board is not
so much an expert body as it is a political body of decisionmakers. The
Board appointment process is structured so that Board members will
reflect the political philosophy of the party in power.9 9 Finally, in de-
fense of state courts, it is difficult to argue that while these courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over most questions of federal law, they are not
competent to adjudicate issues implicating federal labor law.10 0 Assum-
ing that a state court oversteps its authority, the defendant in the state
court action can obtain injunctive relief from the Board.' 0 '
An analysis of the assumptions supporting Garmon reveals that they
either are invalid or not effectuated by the current structure of federal
law. The Garmon rule was established over twenty-five years ago when
the United States Supreme Court perceived a need to protect federal
labor law from interference by state courts. It is time to consider
whether the balance struck by Congress and protected by the Supreme
Court is appropriate in the 1980s.
C. Countervailing Interests
The Garmon decision strikes a balance that favors federal decision-
making when an issue presented for adjudication implicates the NLRA.
State courts must be permitted to play a more important role in our
judicial system. Those courts are responsible for protecting rights cre-
ated by state law and their integrity is undermined when they must defer
so readily to the Board. The federal judicial system and the NLRB face a
caseload that should encourage court involvement.'
0 2
The legitimate rights of employees and employers also are sacri-
97. See supra note 47.
98. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1982).
99. See 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1982). The National Labor Relations Board is subject to
significant political pressures that seek to influence federal labor policies. See Marshall,
supra note 5, at 523.
100. The fact is that there is no evidence that the Board makes its decisions on the basis
of any expertise. See Getman & Goldberg, The Myth of Labor Board Expertise, 39 U. CHI. L.
REV. 681 (1972). The Board does not examine whether its assumptions about the results
of certain labor practices are true in fact. Id. at 682. A prime example of the failure of the
Board to investigate the reality of its assumptions is in the area of campaign practices. The
Board has been criticized for its failure to conform its assumptions to reality. See Bok, The
Regulation of Campaign Tactics in Representation Elections Under the National Labor Relations Act,
78 HARV. L. REV. 38, 46-53 (1964). The fact remains that the Board often is more respon-
sive to political pressures than empirical investigation. See Cox, supra note 33, at 319-21.
101. 29 U.S.C. § 160(j) (1982).
102. See Morris, The Case for Unitary Enforcement of Federal Labor Law-Concerning a Special-
ized Article III Court and the Reorganization of Existing Agencies, 26 Sw. L.J. 471, 481 (1972).
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ficed when a state court does defer to the Board. Under Garmon, a state
court litigant is not permitted to have his or her case heard if the state
action implicates conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the
NLRA. Thus, the litigant is turned away from the protection of local
courts and channeled into a federal agency with which the person proba-
bly has little or no familiarity.'
0 3
V. REFORMULATING BOARD PREEMPTION
A. Garmon: Balancing or Pigeonholing
Garmon purports to establish a broad rule of preemption with cer-
tain categorical exceptions. The job of a state court is to determine
whether the conduct at issue fits into the preemption box or one of the
exception boxes. There is no room to balance state interests with fed-
eral interests because in any doubtful situation, the state court is to de-
fer to the Board. In fact, the Garmon rule is a balancing test that
underwent a metamorphosis. Both of the primary exceptions to Garmon
are the result of balancing state and federal interests. However, what
started out as examples of instances when preemption was not proper,
turned into hard and fast rules to be applied in every fact situation.
10 4
However, while state courts recite the Garmon formulation, it is clear that
they often do little more than balance the state interest and federal
interest.
B. Establishing a New Rationale for Board Preemption
A reformulation of Board preemption requires analysis of the goals
to be achieved by preemption. Federal preemption can be justified
when the state cause of action clearly interferes with federal labor law.
However, preemption has gone too far when a state claim is preempted
on grounds that it arguably implicates section 7 or 8 of the NLRA. A
reformulation of Board preemption should recognize that state courts
must be given credit for their ability to protect the interests of private
litigants without sacrificing the goals of federal law. Similarly, reformu-
lation should place greater emphasis on the rights of state court liti-
gants. Both employees and employers'have righ'ts created by state
statutes and common law. Many of those rights exist irrespective of the
fact that the litigant is part of a labor-management relationship. Fur-
thermore, many of those rights existed when Congress enacted the
NLRA without indicating the extent to which that Act was to displace
preexisting state law. Finally, many of those rights, especially private
property rights, have been recognized for hundreds of years. That en-
durance suggests that state created rights should not readily be sacri-
ficed in the name of protecting the sanctity of federal labor law.
103. See id. at 476-81.
104. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
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C. Reformulating Board Preemption
Board preemption should be reformulated into a two-tiered analy-
sis. 10 5 Tier one would ask whether the state action would regulate con-
duct that is actually protected or prohibited by the NLRA. If the answer
is "yes", the state action should be preempted per se without further in-
vestigation. Under the per se analysis, a state court would first determine
if the state claim implicates conduct that is actually protected or prohib-
ited by the NLRA. That determination would be made, in part, on the
basis of Supreme Court precedent and Board decisions. Second, the
state court would need to determine if resolution of the state claim
would interfere with federal labor law. That determination would be
made by analyzing the similarity between the state claim and the poten-
tial unfair labor practice.' 0 6 If the state claim implicates actually pro-
tected or prohibited conduct and would interfere with federal labor law,
the state claim is preempted.
When the state claim implicates conduct that only is arguably pro-
tected or prohibited by the NLRA, the second tier of preemption analy-
sis would come into play-balancing. Balancing would involve a variety
of factors: the state's interest in remedying the state claim; the plaintiffs
interest; the public's interest; the federal interest; and the degree of in-
terference between state and federal law. The state's interest and plain-
tiffs interest likely will be similar. The nature of the claim can be
examined to determine its relative validity. For example, the state's in-
terest in adjudicating a claim based on a law of general applicability
would have more validity than one based on a specific state labor statute.
The harm suffered by the plaintiff should also be considered. Actual or
potential physical harm to a state litigant might weigh more heavily in
the balance than economic injury. The public interest would support
the state litigant when the litigant's state claim could prevent injury to
the public. Thus, for example, conduct threatening public order might
be a proper subject for state adjudication.
The federal interest can be analyzed on at least two levels. First, a
court could consider the "arguability" of the protected or prohibited
nature of the conduct being evaluated. 10 7 The greater the likelihood
that the conduct is within the scope of the NLRA, the stronger would be
the federal interest. Second, the size of the business and the industry
involved in the dispute could be examined. An industry of national im-
portance, such as the automobile industry, would strengthen the case
for preemption. A relatively small business, even though within the ju-
risdiction of the Board, would not argue for preemption.
105. The analysis suggested here is similar to that used in antitrust litigation where
some conduct is held to be illegal per se while other conduct is only illegal under a rule of
reasonableness. See L. SCHWARTZ,J. FLYNN AND H. FIRST, FREE ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC
ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST 12 (1983).
106. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
107. See Cox, supra note 33, at 289, discussing the ability of a court to examine the
"arguability" of the protected nature of the conduct at issue when determining if preemp-
tion is appropriate.
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Finally, the state court would have to examine the extent to which
resolution of the state claim would interfere with federal law. Again, the
similarity of the state claim and the potential unfair labor practice
should be considered.' 0 8 Interference with federal law would not, in
and of itself, result in preemption; rather, all of the factors outlined
above would have to be examined.
No precise algebraic formula can be suggested for weighing all of
the factors that a court should consider in its balancing analysis. Indeed,
the factors suggested here probably are not exhaustive of the factors to
be considered by the court. Nonetheless, a balancing analysis is a more
honest approach to the problem of preemption.
D. Benefits of Balancing
A balancing analysis of preemption issues candidly recognizes what
courts are in fact doing. State courts can openly admit that they are
weighing the state's interest in adjudicating the state claim with the fed-
eral interest in protecting federal labor law. That honesty will open up
to the deliberative process to a discussion of the policy factors that favor
or oppose preemption.
The policy factor most dramatically brought into focus is the bal-
ance struck by federal law between labor and management. The labor
movement has matured to the point that a hyperpaternalistic federal la-
bor law cannot be justified. None of this is to suggest that the funda-
mental rights of collective action in the NLRA should be cut back;
rather, a reformulation of Garmon recognizes that the heavy hand of the
federal government does not need to tip the scale in favor of collective
bargaining and the labor movement.
Balancing can restore the vitality of state courts by permitting them
to protect the legitimate rights of state court litigants. Under Garmon, a
state court must defer to the Board whenever the state claim implicates
conduct arguably within the NLRA. With balancing, a state court can
consider a variety of factors to determine whether adjudication of the
state claim would unreasonably interfere with federal labor law. Pre-
emption is a federal law issue and state courts would apply federal law
when analyzing the preemption issues; however, state courts should be
permitted to weigh the interest of the state against the federal interest
before determining that its jurisdiction has been withdrawn.
Finally, balancing better protects the rights of state court litigants.
Employees and employers have legitimate state created rights that de-
serve a remedy after violation. Preemption under Garmon too often
shunts the litigant away from a familiar and local state court into an in-
convenient federal beauraucracy. As noted, Garmon favors protection of
federal labor law, collective bargaining, and the labor movement at the
expense of the state court litigant. Admitting that the rights created by
the NLRA are part of a comprehensive federal labor law, it still is true
108. See supra note 60.
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that those rights are statutory and of relatively recent origin. Given the
maturity of the labor movement, it is difficult to argue that rights created
by the NLRA should take such high priority over state created rights.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Garmon rule was formulated over twenty-five years ago when a
need to protect federal labor law as developed by an expert board from
interference by state courts was perceived. A broad rule of Board pre-
emption can no longer be justified. Garmon failed to limit the adjudica-
tion of preemption issues because the supposedly hard and fast rules of
preemption disguised the balancing process that lurked beneath the sur-
face of the doctrine.
A reformulation of Board preemption reevaluates the assumptions
of preemption. The two-tiered balancing process suggested here will
permit state courts to fulfill their purpose by better protecting the legiti-
mate rights of state courts. For the 1980s and beyond, state court liti-
gants should not be required to defer to the NLRB whenever federal
labor law is implicated by the state claim.
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